UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

10-8-2013

Klein v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 40924

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Klein v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 40924" (2013). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 4315.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/4315

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MARC EDWARD KLEIN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

S.Ct. No. 40924
Custer Co. Case CV-2012-56

------------------------------)

OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh
Judicial District of the State ofIdaho
In and For the County of Custer

HONORABLE JOEL E. TINGEY
Presiding Judge

Jeffrey Brownson
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT
303 West Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 343-1000

IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
(208) 334-2400

Attorneys for Appellant

Attorneys for Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

Table of Authorities ....................................................

II.

Statement of the Case .................................................... 1

111

A.

Nature of the Case ................................................. 1

B.

General Course of Proceedings ....................................... 1
1.

Underlying criminal proceedings ................................ 1

2.

Post-conviction proceedings ................................... 5

III.

Issues Presented on Appeal ................................................ 8

IV.

Argument .............................................................. 8
A.

Standards of Review ............................................... 8

B.

Because Mr. Klein's Constitutional Right to Due Process was Violated when the
State Failed to Disclose Impeachment Evidence Regarding the Credibility and
Reliability of Fred Rice, the District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr.
Klein's Claim for Relief ............................................. 9

C.

D.

1.

Pertinent legal standards ...................................... 9

2.

Why relief should be granted .................................. 11

Because Mr. Klein's Counsel Failed to Timely File a Motion to Withdraw His
Guilty Plea, Mr. Klein Received Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and the District
Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Klein's Claim for Relief ......... 15
1.

Pertinent legal standards ..................................... 15

2.

Why relief should be granted .................................. 15

Because Defense Counsel Failed to Investigate the Case or Meaningfully Consult
with an Independent Accident Reconstructionist, Mr. Klein Received Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel and the District Court Erred in Denying Mr. Klein's Claim
for Relief ....................................................... 18

V.

1.

Pertinent legal standards ..................................... 18

2.

Why relief should be granted .................................. 18

Conclusion

........................................................... 27

11

I. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
Alford v. North Carolina, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) ................................................. 3, 11, 13,20,22,26
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) ................................................................. 6,9, 10, 13, 14
Elmore v. Ozmint, 661 F.3d 783 (4th Cir. 2011) ........................................................................ 23
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) ............................................................................. 10
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) .................................................................................... 15, 26
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) ........................................................................... 19
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) .................................................................................. 10, 11
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. - ' 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012) ........................................................ 14,26
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. _, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012) ........................................................ 14,26
Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ........................................................ 15,18,19,23
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) .................................................................................... 10
United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 122 S. Ct. 2450 (2002) ........................................... 6, 13, 14

STATE CASES
Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 61 P.3d 626 (Ct. App. 2002) ............................................... 8,9
Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371,825 P.2d 94 (Ct. App. 1992) ................................................... 26
Mendiola v. State, 150 Idaho 345, 247 P.3d 210 (Ct. App. 2010) ................................................ 9
Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894, 865 P.2d 985 (Ct. App. 1993) ...................................................... 9
Roeder v. State, 144 Idaho 415, 162 P.3d 794 (Ct. App. 2007) .................................................. 11
Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho 292, 92 P.3d 542 (Ct. App. 2004) .................................................. 8,9
State v. Aragon, 114 Idaho 758, 760 P.2d 1174 (1988) .............................................................. 17

III

State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P.3d 727 (2011) ........................................................... 4,17
State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 79 P.3d 711 (2003) ................................................................... 16
State v. LePage, 138 Idaho 803,69 P.3d 1064 (Ct. App. 2003) .................................................... 9
State v. Soto, 121 Idaho 53,822 P.2d 572 (Ct. App. 1991) ......................................................... 26
State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4,9,539 P.2d 556, 561 (1975) ............................................................ 17

STATE STATUTES
Idaho Code § 18-4006(3) ........................................................................................................... 1, 3
Idaho Code § 18-8004( 1) ............................................................................................................... 1

IV

II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the district court's summarily dismissing in part Marc Klein's

petition for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing and the district court's denying
of the remainder of Mr. Klein's petition for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary
hearing.
B.

General Course of Proceedings
1.

Underlying criminal proceedings

On November 11,2010, at approximately 6:45 p.m. on U.S. Highway 93 near milepost
119 in Custer County, Idaho, there was a two vehicle crash involving Jory Twitchell and Marc
Klein. R. Vol. 1, p. 2 & 118. There were no eyewitnesses to the accident. R. Vol. 1, p. 3 & 118.
Mr. Twitchell died shortly after the accident as a result of his injuries. R. Vol. 1, p. 3 & 118.
Mr. Klein informed law enforcement that he did not see the other car prior to the accident and
that he believed the other vehicle came into his lane of travel. R. Vol. 1, p. 3 & 118.
The following day Custer County Prosecuting Attorney Shawn M. Glen filed a Criminal
Complaint in Case No. CR-2010-729 charging Mr. Klein with vehicular manslaughter, a felony,
in violation of Idaho Code § 18-4006(3)(b), and driving under the influence of alcohol
(excessive), a misdemeanor, in violation ofIdaho Code § 18-8004(1)(a). R. Vol. 1, p. 3 & 119.
Mr. Klein retained attorney Justin Oleson to represent him, with Mr. Oleson filing his notice of
appearance on November 22,2010. Hearing on Petition for Post-Conviction Relief Transcript
(Evidentiary Hearing) Transcript ("Evidentiary Hearing Tr."), p. 48, In. 14 - p. 51, In. 15.
On December 13, 2010, a preliminary hearing was held with the Honorable Charles L.

Roos presiding. R. Vol. 1, p. 4 & 119. Idaho State Police Corporal Allen Bivins, who had
prepared an Idaho State Police Traffic Collision Reconstruction and Analysis Report (Exhibit 3),
was a witness at the preliminary hearing. R. Vol. 1, p. 4 -5 & 119 - 120. Corporal Bivins
testified that following the collision both vehicles rotated counterclockwise, that the speed of the
vehicles could not be calculated based on the evidence at the accident site but Mr. Klein's Toyota
pickup was traveling at a lower speed than Mr. Twitchell's Lincoln Continental, and that Mr.
Klein's pickup, which was traveling north, crossed into the southbound lane and collided with
Mr. Twitchell's Lincoln nearly head-on. Id. At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing Judge
Roos found sufficient evidence to bind Mr. Klein over to stand to answer the charges in District
Court. R. Vol. 1, p. 5 & 120.
On December 15,2010, Mr. Klein appeared before the Honorable Joel E. Tingey for a
felony arraignment and the district court on the behalf of Mr. Klein entered a plea of not guilty to
the charges. R. Vol. 1, p. 5 & 120. The court scheduled a pretrial conference for February 16,
2011, and a jury trial for March 2,2011. Evidentiary Hearing Tr., p. 55, Ins. 6 - 13.
Believing there were "problems" with Corporal Bivins' accident reconstruction and his
testimony at the preliminary hearing, following that hearing Mr. Oleson and Mr. Klein discussed
the need to retain an independent accident reconstructionist. Id., p. 53, In. 4 - p. 54, In. 3. One
was never hired however. !d., p. 62, Ins. 10-12. Mr. Oleson's efforts to retain an independent
accident reconstructionist consisted of speaking to one reconstructionist on the telephone for
approximately 10-15 minutes. Id., p. 62, In. 13 - p. 63, In. 4. Though it was mid-December
when he and Mr. Klein first discussed the need to retain an expert, Mr. Oleson did not speak with
an accident reconstructionist until sometime between January 28, 2011 and February 16,2011.
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ld., p. 86, Ins. 6 - 16. Mr. Oleson does not know the name of the person he spoke with but recalls
describing to this person a basic overview of the case, some of the information contained in
Corporal Bivin's report, as well as some of the portions of a subsequent accident reconstruction
report by Sergeant Fred Rice l with the Idaho State Police. ld., p. 62, In. 22 - p. 64, In. 15. Mr.
Oleson did not provide any materials whatsoever for this person to review. ld. At the conclusion
of this telephone call the unnamed accident reconstructionist advised Mr. Oleson that Sgt. Rice is
apparently the "king" of accident reconstruction and that it would be very difficult to refute Sgt.
Rice's conclusions. ld., p. 65, In. 17 - p. 66, In. 5.
On or near February 16, 2011, the date scheduled for the pretrial conference, Mr. Oleson
advised Mr. Klein that he was unable to find anyone who could refute Sgt. Rice's accident
reconstruction. ld., p. 66, Ins. 6 - 16; see also Exhibit 4. Mr. Oleson also conveyed to Mr. Klein
that he could continue to look for other independent accident reconstructionists, telling Mr. Klein
"you can always find a paid whore that'll give you whatever you want if you pay enough money."

ld., p. 73, In. 21 - p. 74, In. 1. On February 16,2013, pursuant to plea negotiations between the
parties, Mr. Klein pled guilty pursuant to Alford v. North Carolina, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) to the
charge of vehicular manslaughter, a felony, in violation ofIdaho Code § 18-4006(3)(b). R. Vol.
l,p.6&120.
Between the time Mr. Oleson was retained and the time Mr. Klein entered an Alford plea,

Presumably, as Corporal Bivins' superior, on November 30, 2010, Fred Rice signed off
on and approved Bivins' accident reconstruction report. Exhibit 3, p. 11. Now in his own
accident reconstruction report, Fred Rice disagreed with Bivins' conclusions in numerous
respects, including such fundamental things as whether Mr. Twichell's vehicle rotated clockwise
or counter-clockwise after the collision or whether the speed of the vehicles could be calculated.
See Exhibits 2 & 3. Mr. Oleson received Fred Rice's accident reconstruction report around
February 9, 2011. Evidentiary Hearing Tr., p. 56, In. 20 - p. 55, In. 8.
1
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Mr. Oleson did little, if any, investigation into the accident. Mr. Oleson did not take any pictures
or measurements of the accident scene. Evidentiary Hearing Tr., p. 58, Ins. 12 - 18. Mr. Oleson
did not personally inspect either of the vehicles involved in the accident as he felt it wasn't
necessary. Id., p. 59, Ins. 1 - 9. He also did not research the history ofMr. Twitchell's car nor do
any investigation into the mechanical history of the car. Id., p. 60, Ins. 6 - 16. In fact he admitted
that he was unaware that Mr. Twitchell's vehicle had been sold and was no longer in the State's
possession when Mr. Klein entered a plea of guilty. Id., p. 60, In. 17 - p. 61, In. 7. Nor did he
hire anyone to help him with these tasks. Id., p. 58 - 61. Finally, Mr. Oleson did not review or
inspect any of the physical evidence in the case. Id., p. 61, Ins. 8 - 19.
On April 20,2011, a sentencing hearing was held and the Honorable Dane Watkins, Jr.
sentenced Mr. Klein to four (4) years determinate and eleven (11) years indeterminate for a
unified sentence of fifteen (15) years. R. Vol. 1, p. 7 & 121. The Judgment of Conviction was
filed by the clerk of the court on April 22, 2011. R. Vol. 1, p. 7 & 121. And on June 3, 2011, the
Judgment of Conviction became final pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 14. R. Vol. 1, p. 7 &
121. On June 27, 2011, Mr. Oleson filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and Affidavit in
Support of Motion to Withdraw Guilty plea based upon the recent opinion in State ofIdaho v.

Jonathan WEllington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P.3d 727 (2011), which was issued by the Supreme
Court on May 27, 2011. R. Vol. 1, p. 7 & 121. Because the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
was filed after the Judgment of Conviction became final, the district court lacked jurisdiction to
withdraw the guilty plea pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 33 and therefore, an Order Denying
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea was entered on August 8, 2011. R. Vol. 1, p. 8 & 121.
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2.

Post-conviction proceedings

On April 19,2012, Mr. Klein filed a Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief along
with the Affidavit of Jeffrey Brownson in Support of Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. R.
Vol. 1, p. 1 - 116. Mr. Klein asserted he should be granted post-conviction relief for three
reasons: 1) that Mr. Klein's rights to due process were violated when the prosecuting attorney
failed to disclose impeachment evidenced regarding the credibility and reliability of Fred Rice; 2)
that Mr. Klein received ineffective assistance of counsel because defense counsel failed to
conduct an independent investigation or consult with an independent accident reconstructionist;
and 3) that Mr. Klein received ineffective assistance of counsel because defense counsel failed to
timely file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. On May 18,2013, the State filed its Answer
to Petition for Post Conviction Relief and Motion for Summary Disposition. R. Vol. 1, p. 117 124.
Mr. Klein subsequently filed Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition and his
Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition on June 18,2013. R.
Vol. 1, p. 125 - 137. Mr. Klein sought summary disposition regarding the violation of his right
to due process because the State withheld evidence regarding Sgt. Rice's credibility and that Mr.
Klein received ineffective assistance of counsel when defense counsel failed to timely file a
motion to withdraw Mr. Klein's guilty plea. Id. Mr. Klein acknowledged that based upon the
State's Answer to Petition for Post Conviction Relief that a genuine issue of material fact may
exist regarding whether Mr. Klein received ineffective assistance of counsel because defense
counsel failed to conduct an independent investigation or consult with an independent accident
reconstructionist and that an evidentiary hearing upon this issue was most likely necessary. R.
5

Vol.1,p.128.
On July 5,2012, the State filed its Memorandum in Support of Respondent's Motion for
Summary Disposition and In Opposition to Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition as well
as two supporting affidavits. R. Vol. 1, p. 138 - 184. The State sought summary disposition of
all three ofMr. Klein's claims for relief. Id. A reply brief was filed by Mr. Klein as well as a
second affidavit of Jeffrey Brownson. R. Vol. 1, p. 185 - 200.
On July 18,2012, the district court heard oral argument on the parties' opposing motions
for summary disposition. Hearing on Petition for Post-Conviction Relief Transcript (CrossMotions for Summary Judgment) Transcript, p. 1 - 43. At the conclusion of the hearing the
district court took the matter under advisement. Id., p. 43, Ins. 2-3.
Then on August 15, 2012, the district court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order
on Motion for Summary Judgment, Summary Dismissal ("Memorandum Decision"). R. Vol. 2,
p. 204 - 217. In its Memorandum Decision the district court granted summary disposition in
favor of the State on Mr. Klein's claim that the State's withholding impeachment evidence was a

Brady violation as well has his claim that defense counsel was ineffective when he failed to
timely file a motion to withdraw Mr. Klein's guilty plea. Id. With regard to the alleged Brady
violation, the district court denied Mr. Klein's claim on two basis. R. Vol. 2, p. 208 - 215. First,
the district court reasoned that "the State relied on the report of Officer Bivins who also testified
at the time of the preliminary hearing." R. Vol. 2, p. 210. And second, the district court relied
upon United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 122 S.Ct. 2450 (2002) to hold that due process does
not require the State to disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering into a plea
agreement with a criminal defendant. R. Vol. 2, p. 210 - 214.
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With regards to Mr. Klein's claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel the
district reasoned that "there is no evidence to support a claim that a failure to review and
understand the significance of the Ellington decision within seven days of its issuance fell below
an objective standard of care. On the contrary, it would seem unreasonable to this Court to
impose a duty on attorneys to fully educate themselves on each new decision issued by an
appellate court within seven days." R. Vol. 2, p. 215. The district court concluded that Mr.
Klein "has not shown that trial counsel's failure to timely file a motion to withdraw Klein's
guilty plea fell below an objective standard." Id
The remaining issue, whether defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel
because he failed to independently investigate the accident and failed to consult with an
independent accident reconstructionist proceeded to an evidentiary hearing on February 15,2013.
Evidentiary Hearing Tr., p. 44 - 106. Mr. Oleson as well as Mr. Klein were called as witnesses.

!d. The parties also stipulated to the admission of Exhibits 1,2 and 3. Id., p. 44, In. 12 - p. 45,
In. 3. On March 8, 2012, both parties filed written closing arguments in light of the testimony
presented at the evidentiary hearing. R. Vol. 2, p. 218 - 239.
On March 20,2013, the district court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order, as well as a Judgment of Dismissal. R. Vol. 2, p. 240 - 250. The district court
concluded that "Klein has failed to establish deficient performance by trial counselor resulting
prejudice under Strickland." R. Vol. 2, p. 249. The district court reasoned that even though
defense counsel only had a 15 minute telephone conversation with one unnamed independent
accident recontructionist over a two month period that "Oleson remained willing to try and locate
a favorable reconstructionist if that was Klein's desire." R. Vol. 2, p. 248. The district court also
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reasoned that defense counsel need not review any of the physical evidence in the case nor
investigate the accident because "Oleson could certainly familiarize himself with the nature of
the accident through photos and reports produced in discovery." ld. The district court stated,
"Oleson's personal investigation of the vehicles and accident site are immaterial." ld. Finally,
the district court found that even had defense counsel retained an independent accident
reconstructionist who could call into question the cause of the accident, "it is not a reasonable
probability that Klein would not have plead guilty." R. Vol. 2, p. 249. This appeal follows.

III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the district court err in summarily denying Mr. Klein's claim that his right to
due process was violated when the State failed to disclose impeachment evidence
regarding the credibility and reliability of Fred Rice?

2.

Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Klein's claim that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel because defense counsel failed to timely
file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea?

3.

Did the district court err in denying Mr. Klein's claim that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel because defense counsel failed to conduct an independent
investigation or adequately consult with an independent accident reconstructionist?

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

Standards of Review
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature.

Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho 292,295,92 P.3d 542, 545 (Ct. App. 2004). Summary dismissal of a
post-conviction action, either upon motion of the court or the state, is permissible only when the
applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact that, ifresolved in the applicant's
favor, would entitle him to the requested relief. Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269,272,61 P. 3d
626,629 (Ct. App. 2002). If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be
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conducted. Sparks, 140 Idaho at 295,92 P.3d at 545. On review of a dismissal of a postconviction relief action without an evidentiary hearing, the appellate court determines whether a
genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
affidavits on file. State v. LePage, 138 Idaho 803, 807,69 P.3d 1064, 1068 (Ct. App. 2003).
Moreover, the appellate court liberally construes the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of
the non-moving party. Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 272,61 P.3d at 629; Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894,
896,865 P.2d 985, 987 (Ct. App. 1993).
When an evidentiary hearing is held, this Court will disturb the lower court's factual
findings if they are clearly erroneous and exercises free review of the district court's application of
the relevant law to the facts. Mendiola v. State, 150 Idaho 345, 348, 247 P.3d 210,213 (Ct. App.
2010).
B.

Because Mr. Klein's Constitutional Right to Due Process was Violated when the
State Failed to Disclose Impeachment Evidence Regarding the Credibility and
Reliability of Fred Rice, the District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr.
Klein's Claim for Relief
1.

Pertinent legal standards

A prosecutor in a criminal case must disclose to the defendant all exculpatory material,
that is, all evidence that is favorable to the accused. This duty on the part of the prosecutor was
established in the seminal case of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and is grounded in the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as well as Article 1, § 13 of
the Idaho Constitution. "[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." ld. at 87. In addition
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to exculpatory evidence, Brady requires the disclosure of evidence impeaching the testimony of a
state witness when the reliability of that witness may be determinative of a criminal defendant's
guilt or innocence. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
The duty of disclosure under Brady extends to all persons working as part of the
prosecution team or intimately connected with the government's case. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514
U.S. 419, 454 (1995) (declining state's request to hold that prosecutor not responsible to disclose
information not known by prosecutor although known by police). In order to comply with Brady,
therefore, 'the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the
others acting on the government's behalf in this case, including the police." Strickler v. Greene,
527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999), quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (internal citation
omitted). "Because prosecutors rely so heavily on the police and other law enforcement
authorities, the obligations imposed under Brady would be largely ineffective if those other
members of the prosecution team had no responsibility to inform the prosecutor about evidence
that undermined the state's preferred theory of the crime." Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d
351,377 (6 th Cir. 2009). Finally, the State's obligation under Brady continued past the entry ofa
plea and sentencing. Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749-750 (9 th Cir. 1992) (Brady duty
continues into post-conviction proceedings).
In order to establish a Brady violation, only three things need be shown: "The evidence at
issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is
impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or
inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued." Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82
(1999). Thus, constitutional error results when favorable evidence is withheld from the defendant
10

"if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result
of the proceedings would have been different." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,437 (1995). "On
a Brady challenge to a guilty plea, the test of materiality (i. e., prejudice) is whether there is a
reasonable probability that, but for the state's failure to produce the information, the defendant
would not have entered the plea but instead would have insisted on going to trial." Roeder v.

State, 144 Idaho 415, 418, 162 P.3d 794, 797 (Ct. App. 2007) (citation omitted).

2.

Why relief should be granted

Unbeknownst to Mr. Klein at the time he entered a guilty plea pursuant to Alford v. North

Carolina, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), Sgt. Rice previously provided testimony that was found to be
inconsistent and contradictory to his testimony in prior cases. On March 13,2009, in the First
Judicial District of the State ofIdaho, County of Kootenai, the Honorable John P. Luster found
that Sgt. Rice had provided testimony at the jury trial in State ofIdaho v. Jonathan Wade

Ellington, Kootenai County Case No. F-06-1497 that was inconsistent and wholly contradictory to
testimony provided by Sgt. Rice in an Elmore County case, State v. Ciccone, two and a half years
earlier. R. Vol. 1, p. 27 - 41.
District Judge John P. Luster noted in his written decision that "[t]he evidence in question
is testimony from the same witness in a prior proceeding that contradicts the testimony given at
trial [in this matter]." R. Vol. 1, p. 35. Judge Luster, referring to Sgt. Rice, went further to say,
"[t]his court would be remiss not to express some concern about the integrity of this witness that
has been called into question in this case. This is especially true when it pertains to a trained
professional with the Idaho State Police." R. Vol. 1, p. 38. This evidence that a district court in
the State of Idaho had found Sgt. Rice unreliable and not credible is undeniably impeachment
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evidence. Judge Luster himself found that Sgt. Rice's inconsistent testimony would serve to
impeach Rice's credibility. The prosecuting attorney nor Fred Rice never disclosed this
information to Mr. Klein. R. Vol. 1, p. 48 & 123.
As noted above however, the district court granted summary disposition in favor of the
State citing two reasons. First, the district court held that "any historical problems with Rice's
credibility were too attenuated to have a real or meaningful effect on voluntariness of Klein's
Alford plea." R. Vol. 2, p. 21

°-

211. The district court premised this upon the understanding that

the state could still rely upon the Bivins' accident reconstruction report and that there was no
evidence that Rice's conclusions in this case "were based on the same type of false opinions as
highlighted in Ellington." R. Vol. 2, p. 210. The district court was simply mistaken and failed to
grasp the significance of Sgt. Rice's proposed testimony in this case and his credibility.
The accident in this case occurred on November 11, 2010. Eight days later Corporal
Bivins completed his accident reconstruction report. R. Vol. 1, p. 177. Sgt. Rice on November
30, 2010, signed off and approved the report. !d. Corporal Bivins then testified at the preliminary
hearing consistent with the findings and conclusions in his report. As noted above, defense
counsel felt there were problems with Bivins' testimony and that much of it "didn't make sense."
Evidentiary Hearing Tr., p. 71, Ins. 2-3. Most certainly the State felt the same way as evidenced
by the fact that Sgt. Rice subsequently did his own accident reconstruction report on February 4,
2011. Sgt. Rice's new accident reconstruction report contradicted the previous report that he
approved in various aspects, two of which were as fundamental as the direction of rotation of Mr.
Twitchell's vehicle following impact and that now the State was able to estimate the speed of both
vehicles at the time of impact whereas it had previously maintained it was unable to do so.
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Compare Exhibit 2 with Exhibit 3. Simply put, Bivins' report was no longer credible even in the
State's opinion since it was now inconsistent with Sgt. Rice's new report. As such, the district
court's conclusion that the State could still rely Bivins' report is a misunderstanding of the
proceedings below and the content of the dueling reports from the Idaho State Police. Most
importantly however, the fact that the State had two, albeit inconsistent, accident reconstruction
reports does not alleviate the State of its obligation under Brady and its progeny to disclose
evidence regarding Sgt. Rice's credibility and reliability.
The second reason cited by the district court as its basis for granting summary disposition
in favor of the State was that pursuant to Us. v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 122 S.Ct. 2450 (2002), there
is no constitutional obligation to provide impeachment information during plea bargaining. R.
Vol. 2, p. 211 - 214. In Ruiz, the Supreme Court held the Constitution does not require the
disclosure of impeachment evidence prior to a guilty plea because impeachment information
relates to a defendant's right to a fair trial and not whether a plea is voluntary. Id. at 628 - 33.
The district court's reliance is misplaced however because under the unique circumstances of this
case and the fact that Mr. Klein entered an Alford plea, Ruiz should not control. Mr. Klein was in
a much different position than Ms. Ruiz.
Some defendants cannot determine their guilt or innocence absent Brady disclosures.
When, as is the case here, a defendant has no recollection ofthe events that give rise to the
criminal charges, he does not necessarily know whether or not he is guilty. When a defendant
lacks conclusive knowledge of his guilt or innocence, the pre-plea disclosure of eXCUlpatory
evidence is significant and necessary in order to prevent miscarriages of justice. Moreover, when
a defendant has no recollection of the event, he cannot swear in open court that he has committed
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an offense. Instead the defendant is left in the position of deciding whether to accept a plea offer
or go to trial based upon the weight of the State's evidence against him and his attorney's advice.
Such a situation was even acknowledged by the Ruiz Court - the "degree of help that
impeachment information can provide will depend upon the defendant's own independent
knowledge of the prosecution's potential case .... " Id. at 630. In the context such as the one
present in this case, the disclosure of Brady material is vital to ensure the voluntary and intelligent
nature of a plea pursuant to a plea agreement. An innocent defendant with no independent
recollection of the events may plead guilty because he lacks knowledge about the nature of the
offense and does not know whether he has committed the charged offense unless full disclosure is
made by the state. Under these circumstance, this Court should find that Ruiz is not determinative
of this issue and that when a defendant does not know whether they are guilty of the offense
charged the state has an obligation to produce all Brady material prior to entering into a plea
agreement with a defendant.
Similarly, the Supreme Court has recently held that the Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel extends to plea negotiations and in deciding whether to accept or
reject a plea offer from the state. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. _, 132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012); and
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. _, 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012). This right to effective assistance of
counsel would be rendered meaningless unless counsel's advice, strategy, and efforts were
premised upon a full understanding of the prosecution's case, including any exculpatory and
impeaching evidence in the exclusive control of the state.
Because Mr. Klein has proven that there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceedings would have been different - that being
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that Mr. Klein would not have entered the plea but instead would have insisted on going to trial
Mr. Klein's conviction must be vacated. See R. Vol. 1, p. 10. The district court's finding that the
problems with Sgt. Rice's credibility were "too attenuated" was based upon a mistaken
understanding of the proceedings below and a failure to grasp the significance of the impeachment
material at issue. Finally, in the context of plea agreements when the defendant has no
recollection of the events, due process should require the State to disclose all evidence that is
favorable to the accused, including impeachment evidence.
C.

Because Mr. Klein's Counsel Failed to Timely File a Motion to Withdraw His Guilty
Plea, Mr. Klein Received Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and the District Court
Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Klein's Claim for Relief
1.

Pertinent legal standards

A defendant in a criminal case is also guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel under
both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 13
of the Idaho Constitution. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether based upon the
state or federal constitution, is analyzed under the familiar Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984) standard. In order to prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must prove: 1) that counsel's
perfonnance was deficient in that it fell below standards of reasonable professional perfonnance,
and 2) that this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466
u.S. at 689. The prejUdice prong ofthe test is shown if there is a reasonable probability that a
different result would have been obtained in the case if the attorney had acted properly. !d. "[I]n
order to satisfY the "prejudice" requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted
on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,59 (1985).
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2.

Why relief should be granted

Even though there existed sufficient time for defense counsel to file a motion to withdraw
Mr. Klein's guilty plea prior to the district court losing jurisdiction, defense counsel unexplainably
failed to do so. Nevertheless, the district court summarily dismissed Mr. Klein's claim for relief
stating "there is no evidence to support a claim that a failure to review and understand the
significance of the Ellington decision within seven days of its issuance fell below an objective
standard of care. On the contrary, it would seem unreasonable to this Court to impose a duty on
attorneys to fully educate themselves on each new decision issued by an appellate court within
seven days." R. Vol. 2, p. 215. The district court's summary dismissal was in error because
counsel's failure to timely file the motion did fall below an objective standard of care.
Reasonable professional performance requires counsel to be aware of the governing rules of
procedure, the law, and to file motions in a timely fashion.
On April 22, 2011, the Judgment of Conviction in the underlying criminal case was file
stamped by the clerk of the court. R. Vol. 1, p. 7 & 121. Under Idaho Appellate Rule 14, the
Judgment of Conviction became final forty-two days later - on June 3, 2011. Because the district
court loses jurisdiction once the judgment becomes final, any motion to withdraw a guilty plea
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) needed to be filed on or before June 3, 2011. See State v.
Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 79 P.3d 711 (2003).

Defense counsel filed a motion seeking to withdraw Mr. Klein's guilty plea on June 27,
2011, more than three weeks after the district court no longer had jurisdiction of the matter. R.
Vol. 1, p. 7 & 121. The basis for the motion as set forth by defense counsel was:
In this matter an Alford plea was entered in this case. The Defendant admitted that
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based upon the evidence the State had there would be sufficient evidence tht the
jury could convict in this case. The initial officer at the preliminary hearing could
not confirm that the Defendant had drove across the center line and caused the
accident. However, based upon the report of Fred Rice and the conclusions made
by him, the Defendant agreed to plead guilty to the offense.
However, based upon the newly discovery evidence and the recent opinion in State
of Idaho v. Jonathan W Ellington, recently decided by the Idaho Supreme Court
and filed on May 27,2011, Fred Rice provided false testimony in that trial which
went to the Defendant's sole defense. If the Defendant would have know [sic] that
at the time of his plea that Cpl. Rice's testimony was suspect, he would not have
entered the plea.
R. Vol. 2, p. 201 (Exhibit J, Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, pp. 1-2).
"In evaluating counsel's conduct, [the Idaho Supreme Court] has used as a 'starting point'
the American Bar Association's standards entitled 'The Defense Function,' which are also a guide
by which counsel's performance is judged in a disciplinary proceeding." State v. Aragon, 114
Idaho 758, 761,760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988) (citing State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 9, 539 P.2d 556,
561 (1975». "After informing himself or herself on the facts and the law, defense counsel should
advise the accused with complete candor concerning all aspects of the case, including a candid
estimate of the probable outcome." ABA Defense Function Standard 4-5. 1(a) (emphasis added).
Defense counsel has an obligation and duty to stay apprised of the current state of the law and to
timely review appellate decision. See ABA Defense Function Standard 4-3.6 ("Many important
rights of the accused can be protected and preserved only by prompt legal action.").
Defense counsel in the motion itself acknowledges that the Ellington decision was issued
on May 27,2011. Inexplicably however defense counsel does not file the motion until June 27,
2011. Seven days existed between the issuance of the Ellington decision and the judgment
becoming final in the underlying case, yet no motion was timely filed. The motion to withdraw
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guilty plea should have been timely filed and in failing to do so, defense counsel was deficient.
There simply is no strategic reason or valid excuse not to timely file the motion when sufficient
time to do so existed.

D.

Because Defense Counsel Failed to Investigate the Case or Meaningfully Consult
with an Independent Accident Reconstructionist, Mr. Klein Received Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel and the District Court Erred in Denying Mr. Klein's Claim for
Relief
1.

Pertinent legal standards

As with Mr. Klein's previous claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, in order for relief
to be granted he must prevail under the Strickland standard, which for the sake of brevity will not
be repeated here.

2.

Why relief should be granted

Mr. Klein received ineffective assistance of counsel from defense counsel because counsel
failed to independently investigate the accident or meaningfully consult with an independent
accident reconstructionist, let alone have an accident reconstructionist even review either the
Bivins Accident Reconstruction Report (Exhibit 3) or the Rice Accident Reconstruction Report
(Exhibit 2). These deficiencies unequivocally prejudiced Mr. Klein because had counsel
conducted even some investigation, Mr. Klein would not have pled guilty.
The district court however denied Mr. Klein's request for post-conviction relief after an
evidentiary hearing. The district court held that defense counsel's conduct did not fall below an
objective standard of reasonableness. R. Vol. 2, p. 248. The district court stated specifically that
there "was nothing deficient in Oleson reporting to Klein his findings regarding Bivens' [sic] and
Rice's opinions. Oleson remained willing to try to locate a favorable reconstructionist if that was
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Klein's desire. Again, it is this Court's opinion that Oleson's conduct did not fall below an
objective standard." Id. The district court also was not concerned that defense counsel did not
investigate the case. Id. The district court concluded that defense counsel's investigation into the
accident would have been "immaterial." Id. Finally, the district court opined that there was no
resulting prejudice to Mr. Klein because "this Court does not believe that but for the alleged
deficient performance, Klein would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on
proceeding with trial. R. Vol. 2, p. 248 - 249. The district court's legal conclusions are a
misapplication of the facts presented at the evidentiary hearing and their application to the law.
Reasonable professional performance requires defense counsel in a criminal case to
conduct adequate investigation of the allegations. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691; Kimmelman v.

Morrison, 477 U.S. 365,384 (1986). In an attempt to provide some guidance as to what sort of
investigation is required, the Strickland Court referred to the "[p]revailing norms of practice as
reflected in American Bar Association [ABA] standards and the like" as guides for determining
what is reasonable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Those ABA standards require defense counsel
to:
Conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and to explore all
avenues. . .. The investigation should always include efforts to secure
information in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities.
The duty to investigate exists regardless of the accused's admissions or statements
to the lawyer of facts constituting guilt or the accused's stated desire to plead
guilty.
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, The Defense Function, Rule 4-4.1 (2d ed.1986). Here, the
evidence shows that counsel did not conduct any sort of meaningful investigation.
Counsel was retained to represent Mr. Klein sometime between the 12th and the 17th of
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November, 2010. Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, p. 48, In. 14 - p. 49, In. 22. On November 12,
2010, Mr. Klein was charged in Custer County with vehicular manslaughter and excessive DUI.

Id., p. 48, In. 12 - p. 51, In. 8. As noted above, these charges arose from a two vehicle accident
that occurred on November 11,2010, between a 1988 Toyota Pickup driven by Mr. Klein and a
1995 Lincoln Continental driven by Mr. Twitchell that occurred near mile post 118 on US 93
approximately nine (9) miles north of Mackay, Idaho. See Exhibits 1,2, & 3. There were no
witnesses to the accident, (Evidentiary Hearing Tr., p. 57, Ins. 17 - 22) and Mr. Klein had no
recollection of the accident. Id., p. 89, Ins. 7 - 12.
Defense counsel filed a notice of appearance on November 22, 2010, the date initially
scheduled for Mr. Klein's preliminary hearing. !d., p. 51, Ins. 9 - 19. This preliminary hearing
was continued and subsequently held on December 13,2010. Id., p. 51, In. 20 - p. 52, In. 2. At
the preliminary hearing, Corporal Bivins testified regarding the accident reconstruction he had
completed on November 18,2010. Id., p. 52, In. 23 - p. 53, In. 3; see also Exhibit 3. Because
defense counsel had "a lot of concerns" about Corporal Bivins' testimony and conclusions, he and
Mr. Klein discussed and agreed that the defense should retain an independent accident
reconstructionist, but this never occurred. Id., p. 53, In. 4 - p. 54, In. 3; p. 95, In. 22 - p. 96, In. 3.
The matter was scheduled for a district court arraignment on December 15, 2010. Id., p.
54, Ins. 4 - 16. At the arraignment, not guilty pleas were entered and the matter was set for a
pretrial conference on February 16,2011, and a jury trial on March 2,2011. Id., p. 55, Ins. 6 - 13.
Ultimately, at the pretrial conference on February 16,2011, pursuant to defense counsel's plea
negotiations with the prosecuting attorney, Mr. Klein entered an Alford plea to the charge of
vehicular manslaughter.
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Most concerning however, since being retained in mid-November 2010, defense counsel
had done essentially nothing to investigate the circumstances surrounding the accident or consult
with an independent accident reconstructionist in any meaningful way. As more thoroughly
explained below, for more than three (3) months the only efforts made by counsel to
independently investigate the accident or retain an expert witness was a brief telephone
conversation with one accident reconstructionist whose name defense counsel does not remember,
and another telephone conversation with Sgt. Rice, an accident reconstructionist brought on to the
case by the prosecuting attorney in an effort to rehabilitate the State's case against Mr. Klein.
Throughout the course of the case, defense counsel received discovery from the
prosecuting attorney. Id., p. 55, In. 20 - p. 57, In. 8. This included police reports, medical
records, photographs, and other materials. Id. It also included an accident reconstruction report
conducted by Sgt. Rice which was received either February 8th or 9th - essentially one week prior
to the scheduled pretrial conference/change of plea hearing. Id., p. 56, In. 20 - p. 57, In. 8; and
Exhibit 2.
Besides reviewing the materials provided in discovery and a couple of telephone
conversations, defense counsel's independent investigation amounted to stopping at the accident
scene "at least once, maybe twice" since it happened to be along the route for counsel to appear in
the Custer County Courthouse. Id., p. 57, In. 23 - p. 58, In. 11. Defense counsel did not take
pictures or measurements of the accident scene. Id., p. 58, Ins. 12 - 19. Nor did he hire anyone to
take any pictures or measurements. Id., p. 58, Ins. 20 - 25. Because he "didn't feel a need to,"
counsel did not look at or inspect either of the vehicles involved in the accident. Id., p. 59, Ins. 1 9. Nor did he hire anyone to do so. !d., p. 59, Ins. 13 - 15. Counsel also failed to personally
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inspect or hire anyone to inspect any of the physical evidence in the case, including the headlights
and taillights of either vehicle. Jd.,p. 61, Ins. 8 -19.
Defense counsel admitted he did not even research the history of the victim's vehicle,
including whether it had a history of mechanical failures or whether it was a salvaged vehicle. Jd.,
p. 60, Ins. 6 - 16. Sadly, counsel was completely unaware that the victim's vehicle, a previously
salvaged vehicle (see Exhibit 4 to Dave Jakovac's Accident Reconstruction Report (Exhibit 1»
had been sold approximately one week after the accident and was no longer in the State's
possession when Mr. Klein entered his Alford plea. Jd., p. 60, In. 25 - p. 61, In. 7.
Moreover, even though he and Mr. Klein agreed on December 13,2010, following the
preliminary hearing that an accident reconstructionist should be retained, counsel never retained
one. Jd., p. 62, Ins. 10 - 12. Counsel's efforts to retain an expert boils down to one approximately
10-15 minute conversation with an unnamed accident reconstructionist. Jd., p. 62, In. 13 - p. 63,
In. 4. Defense counsel acknowledged that beyond the brief telephone conversation he did not
provide anything for the potential accident reconstructionist to review - no discovery materials,
photographs, police reports, or at the very least Bivins' and Rice's accident reconstruction reports.
Jd., p. 263, In. 5 - p. 64, In. 3. Perhaps most troubling, this one conversation with a potential

expert witness did not occur until approximately one week prior to the scheduled pretrial
conference, or put differently, approximately two months after he and Mr. Klein agreed to retain
an accident reconstructionist. Jd., p. 21, In. 16 - 18. Counsel's delay in even inquiring of
potential case consultants is bewildering. Moreover it undermines the district court's finding and
emphasis upon the point that defense counsel "remained willing to try and locate a favorable
reconstructionist if that was Klein's desire." R. Vol. 2, p. 248. The jury trial was scheduled to
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commence in essentially two weeks - there was no time to continue to search for an expert as
counsel had already sat idly by for months.
Apparently, based upon counsel providing a "basic overview" of what the case was about,
this one unnamed accident reconstructionist responded that Rice was an authoritative figure in the
field of accident reconstruction and the "likelihood of anything coming out of it that was different
from Fred Rice's opinion was almost nil and nothing." Evidentiary Hearing Tr., p. 64, In. 4 - p.
66, In. 1. Defense counsel then, having expended very little effort or diligence, conveyed to Mr.
Klein that he was unable to find anyone who would be able to refute Rice's accident
reconstruction report. Exhibit 4. Defense counsel also conveyed to Mr. Klein that it was
counsel's personal belief that Sgt. Rice is a persuasive and believable witness. !d., p. 36, In. 8 - p.
37, In. 15. However our Constitution demands more of defense counsel:
A healthy skepticism of authority, while generally advisable, is an absolute
necessity for a lawyer representing a client charged with capital murder. After all,
the custodians of authority in our democracy are ordinary people with imperfect
skills and human motivations. The duty of the defense lawyer "is to make the
adversarial testing process work in the particular case," Strickland, 466 U.S. at
690, 104 S.Ct. 2052 - an obligation that cannot be shirked because of the lawyer's
unquestioning confidence in the prosecution.
Elmore v. Ozmint, 661 F.3d 783,859 (4th Cir. 2011), as amended (Dec. 12,2012).

A brief telephone conversation merely covering the most basic details of an accident with
only one potential expert constitutes deficient perfonnance. Accident reconstruction requires an
expert to gather a vast array of data, evaluate and analyze the data, and then detennine, based
upon accepted laws of physics and engineering, the scenario that best represents the actual
accident. Discussing an accident verbally for fifteen (15) minutes does not allow for a sufficient
understanding of all the critical facts, physical evidence, and variables that are needed to
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objectively determine the collision cause and responsible party.
Had counsel actually consulted with an independent accident reconstructionist in a
meaningful manner, he and Mr. Klein would have learned Sgt. Rice's accident reconstruction
report did in fact contain significant errors and its results were not supported by the physical
evidence that was documented by the Idaho State Police at the accident location. Though not
exhaustive, defense counsel and Mr. Klein would have learned:
- The more likely cause of the accident was due to the excessive speed of Mr. Twitchell,
whereas both Mr. Twitchell and Mr. Klein collided near the centerline of the US 93
roadway.
- Mr. Twitchell's pre-impact velocity was approximately 75-78 miles per hour and may
have been faster if Mr. Twitchell had applied the brakes but did not leave tire skid marks.
- Fred Rice's calculations have errors of gross magnitude and employed the use of vector
analysis equations that did not apply to the accident conditions and physical constraints.
- The Idaho State Police knowingly documented and did not evaluate field evidence and
information relevant to the accident reconstruction analysis results.
- Fred Rice's accident reconstruction report was generated by using linear momentum and
vector analysis which would not be a viable application in a case where vehicles have
collided with angular acceleration causing rotation as well as the rollover event ofMr.
Twitchell's vehicle.
- Fred Rice's angle of approach for the two vehicles and the impact engagement diagram
was not utilized in the calculations consistently.
- There was not a common ordinate with O-degrees used with the stated azimuth of
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engagement between the two vehicles.
- The standard co-efficient of friction values used by Fred Rice on asphalt concrete
pavement and gravel were reduced by 50% without explanation or evidence to support this
large correction to a standard factor.
- Fred Rice's results were not supported by physical evidence that the Idaho State Police
documented at the site.
- The Idaho State Police investigation omitted evaluation of mechanical failure, electrical
failures, and did not address any need for corrective eyewear or night vision issues.
- The point or area of impact Fred Rice cited was not accurate and may be as much as 8 to
16 feet off from where the initial impact occurred.
- The collision may have initiated near, if not within, the northbound lane - Mr. Klein's
lane of travel.
- The apparent focus of the Idaho State Police was to convict the driver that was impaired
from excessive alcohol consumption and not an objective and thorough accident
reconstruction.
See Exhibit 1 (FJD Accident Reconstruction Report).
It must also be noted that the accident reconstruction performed by FDJ Engineering did

not employ novel concepts or laws of physics, or overly specialized software unavailable to the
state. The Idaho State Police is a registered user of EDC software but apparently, it was not used
by them to evaluate this accident. !d., p. 10. Instead, Sgt. Rice relied upon vector and linear
momentum analysis which was an inappropriate methodology for this accident.
Similarly, it goes without saying that merely stopping at the accident scene one or two
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times is a woefully inadequate investigation. Defense counsel did nothing to secure or inspect any
of the physical evidence in this case. Counsel's complete failure to investigate the circumstances
of this case is best exemplified by his unawareness that the prosecution was no longer in
possession of the most important piece of physical evidence - the victim's vehicle.
As a result, Mr. Klein's plea in this case, relying upon the advice of his attorney and the
Rice Accident Reconstruction Report, cannot be considered a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
plea. "Where, as here, a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea process and enters
his plea upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's
advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Griffith v.

State, 121 Idaho 371, 373, 825 P.2d 94,96 (Ct. App. 1992); see also State v. Soto, 121 Idaho 53,
55,822 P.2d 572,574 (Ct. App. 1991); and Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). Defense
counsel himself even confessed that his advice to Mr. Klein about whether Mr. Klein should plead
guilty or not would have been different had he been aware Rice's report contained significant
errors. Evidentiary Hearing Tr., p. 67, In. 20 - p. 68, In. 1. Furthermore, the United States
Supreme Court recently made clear that a criminal defendant's right under the Sixth Amendment
to the effective assistance of competent counsel extends to the plea-bargaining process and in
deciding whether to accept or reject a plea offer from the state. See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S.
_ , 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012); and Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. _ , 132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012).
The prejudice here is self-evident. Mr. Klein would not have pled guilty had he reviewed
an independent accident reconstruction report setting forth the errors in Rice's report. Evidentiary
Hearing Tr., p. 48, In. 23 - p. 49, In. 15. Instead, Mr. Klein, accepting the representations made to
him that there was sufficient evidence to find him guilty at trial, entered an Alford plea to a crime
26

he did not recall committing and likely did not commit. Defense counsel advised Mr. Klein that
he was unable to "find anyone that would be credible in disputing [Sgt.] Rice's analysis" when, in
fact, Sgt. Rice's analysis contains errors of gross magnitude. The FJD Accident Reconstruction
Report unequivocally disputes Sgt. Rice's analysis.

v.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Klein respectfully asks this Court to reverse the district court's judgment dismissing
his post-conviction claims and to remand this case for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted this ~ day of October, 2013.
, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
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